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Abstract 
In light of Musolino, Chunyo and Landau’s findings and conclusions regarding syntax 
comprehension in Williams syndrome (this issue), we review the criteria used to determine 
whether the development of language is typical or atypical and our current understanding of 
the causes of language delay. Given a certain set of theoretical assumptions (e.g., 
generative / modular), fairly poor performance can nevertheless be viewed as indicating 
typical development. Given other theoretical assumptions (e.g., a neuroconstructivist view 
of constrained development), the same data can be viewed as indicative of atypicality. 
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1. Introduction 
A group of individuals with the rare genetic syndrome Williams syndrome (WS), who have 
a mean chronological age of sixteen years, are given a language comprehension task. The 
task has greatly simplified task demands: the individuals need only decide whether a 
spoken sentence is a correct depiction of a pictorially represented scenario: yes or no. The 
individuals with WS perform much worse on this task than would be expected for their age 
(in this particular study, age appropriate performance is estimated from that of 
undergraduate students). Indeed, the individuals with WS perform so poorly that they are 
worse than six-year-old children, some ten years younger. The task also includes control 
conditions, which are used to predict performance on the key experimental conditions. The 
individuals with WS show a different relationship between control and experimental 
conditions to the six year olds. They do, however, show a similar relationship as that 
observed in four-year-old children (some twelve years younger), while performing at a 
higher overall level than the four year olds. 
From the behavioural data of this sort, Musolino, Chunyo and Landau (this issue) 
concluded that individuals with WS acquire language no differently and develop grammars 
indistinguishable from those of typically developing individuals. They concluded that 
language acquisition is not fundamentally altered in WS. 
How did we get to a point where such poor performance on a language 
comprehension task can be viewed as evidence of normal processes of language 
development? If such poor performance can be viewed as evidence of normality, what does 
it take not to have normally developing language according to this task, or more generally? 
In this article, we consider the theoretical assumptions necessary to draw conclusions like 
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those of Musolino, Chunyo and Landau (henceforth MCL) from the observed behavioural 
data, and place them in the context of alternative theoretical assumptions that would lead to 
a different conclusion. We take the opportunity to review our current understanding of the 
notion of developmental delay, and to consider the criteria that determine when poor 
language performance in developmental disorders should be viewed as atypical 
development. 
2. Assumptions 
First, some background to this debate: MCL favour a generative / modular view of the 
development of the language system and in respect of WS, the hypothesis that the 
computational system of language (abstract grammatical knowledge) develops normally in 
this disorder despite moderate learning disability. MCL cast this view in opposition to one 
particular neuroconstructivist hypothesis on language development in WS (the Imbalance 
hypothesis; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003). MCL interpreted the Imbalance hypothesis 
as (a) rejecting modularity as a developmental startstate and (b) proposing that language 
develops atypically in WS. The behavioural data were then offered as favouring the 
modular view and sufficient to reject the neuroconstructivist Imbalance hypothesis. 
Notably, MCL’s argument did not proceed by direct falsification. Their study could 
have been constructed in the following way: Theoretical Position 1 predicts data A, 
Theoretical Position 2 predicts data B; the results turned out to be data A, therefore Position 
1 was supported and Position 2 was falsified. In contrast, the behavioural data had aspects 
that could be viewed by both Position 1 and Position 2 as supporting their theories, 
depending on the assumptions used in interpreting the results. The MCL study, therefore, 
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revolved around a particular way of interpreting the data, rather than arbitrating between 
hypotheses from competing theories. 
What are the assumptions by which MCL were able to view WS language 
development as normal despite the low levels of accuracy exhibited by the group? There 
are two. The first assumption is that in the comprehension task, above chance accuracy 
levels under binary-forced-choice conditions can only be achieved by possession of certain 
key syntactic and semantic knowledge. Any performance above chance is then deemed 
sufficient to demonstrate the presence of this knowledge. The second assumption relies on 
a distinction employed in the generative tradition between syntactic knowledge 
(competence) and the processes making use of that knowledge (performance). The second 
assumption is that the extent to which accuracy exceeds chance levels (for instance 
compared to chronological or mental-age-matched controls) reflects performance factors 
only, and not differences in underlying grammatical knowledge. With these assumptions in 
place, once above-chance accuracy levels were observed, the authors could conclude that 
individuals with WS have normal grammatical knowledge. Note that the second 
assumption is not necessarily reflective of the generative approach per se. For example, 
Perovic and Wexler (in press) recently used a binary-forced-choice sentence-picture 
matching task to explore comprehension of the verbal passive in children with WS. Perovic 
and Wexler interpreted accuracy levels that differed reliably from chance in the disorder 
group as indicative of atypical syntactic knowledge (specifically, a difficulty forming 
argument chains) based on comparison to several control groups matched on standardised 
measures including non-verbal reasoning, receptive vocabulary, and receptive grammar. 
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Like Perovic and Wexler, a neuroconstructivist would view differences in accuracy 
levels above chance compared to control groups as informative about the developmental 
state of the language comprehension system. A comparison of the developmental state of 
this system to other components of the overall language system (e.g., phonology, 
vocabulary, pragmatics) would be taken as informative about the developmental history of 
the language system and the nature of the constraints operating on it. How was task 
performance related to other language skills? MCL compared the WS group to a control 
group matched on the non-verbal sub-test of the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT; 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990). The results indicated that comprehension in the 
syntax/semantics task was poorer in the WS group than expected given their non-verbal 
intelligence. MCL reported that the individuals with WS performed better on the verbal 
sub-test of the KBIT, which tapped receptive vocabulary ability, than the non-verbal sub-
test of the KBIT. We can therefore also infer that WS performance on the syntax/semantics 
task was (much) poorer than expected given their receptive vocabulary ability. 
For the neuroconstructivist, three aspects of the empirical data might be viewed as 
clues that the language system is not developing normally: (1) the presence of differences 
in performance levels compared to chronological and mental age matched control groups; 
(2) an unusual developmental relationship between the experimental and control conditions 
within the task; and, (3) an unusual developmental relationship between performance on the 
syntax/semantics task and receptive vocabulary ability. Moreover, because 
neuroconstructivism does not embrace the distinction between competence and 
performance, a primary focus is why there should be such a large developmental delay in 
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language comprehension – even if to answer this question involves understanding the 
nature of learning disability itself. 
 In short, based on the behavioural data reported by MCP, the description of WS 
syntax development as normal depends on a set of a priori assumptions about which aspects 
of the behavioural data are of interest. 
3. Implications for modularity 
In their discussion, MCL considered more widely whether their data on language 
comprehension in WS pose a challenge to neuroconstructivism. They accepted some of the 
tenets of neuroconstructivism (the importance of adopting a developmental perspective; 
ultimately seeking for lower-level underlying causes for developmental disorders).  
However, they maintained generally that modularity should be a central concept in 
explaining the uneven cognitive profile observed in WS, and specifically that the normal 
development of syntax (as they construed it) represents a capability that develops normally 
independently from the rest of the language system and independently from the rest of 
cognition. 
Two points are worth making here. First, an additional tenet of neuroconstructivism 
is the importance of the sensitivity of the behavioural measures in determining whether a 
given ability develops normally (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; Mareschal et al., 2007). It has 
already been demonstrated that if insensitive behavioural measures are used (e.g., those 
relying on accuracy, without time pressure, and with restricted options for responding), 
then it is possible for atypical cognitive processes to deliver behaviours that fall in the 
normal range. Indeed, we know this to be true of WS itself, in the domain of face 
recognition: for their age-appropriate level of face recognition on a relatively insensitive 
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standardised test (the Benton task; Benton, 1983), children with WS revealed atypical 
underlying processes on more sensitive experimental measures (Annaz et al., 2009; 
Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004). One important question, then, is whether the Truth Value 
Judgement Task (Crain & Thornton, 1998) used by MCL is a sufficiently sensitive measure 
to tell us how children were producing their responses on the task. Each of the conditions 
used by MCL required only eight binary forced-choice decisions. Responses were not 
speeded and the nature of incorrect responses was uninformative.  As Leonard (1998) has 
argued, one of the key markers of atypical rather than delayed development is qualitatively 
atypical errors in the disorder group (see also Thomas et al., 2009). Yet the task design 
offered no scope for such errors and therefore reduced the opportunity to classify 
development as anything other than delayed. Given the limited information provided by the 
task measure, MCL had to assume that task performance necessarily reflected the requisite 
knowledge of core syntactic and semantic principles posited in their theoretical framework. 
Of course, in doing so, MCL were right to point out that any competing hypothesis must 
explain how else above-chance performance could be achieved on their task. 
The second point worth making is that the neuroconstructivist emphasis on 
developmental change has implications for the role that modularity can play in explaining 
uneven cognitive profiles. The emphasis on developmental change leads both to the use of 
particular methodological approaches (e.g., research designs that trace developmental 
trajectories, rather than collapsing participant groups over wide age ranges; see Thomas et 
al., 2009), and to the formulation of explanations with certain characteristics (e.g., theories 
that features concepts such as plasticity, adaptation, interactivity, redundancy, and 
compensation; see Thomas, 2005). Within a developmental framework, it is far from clear 
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that invoking modularity per se in the startstate of a given disorder is sufficient to explain 
proposed selective deficits or islets of normality in behaviours observed in later childhood 
(Thomas, Purser & Richardson, in press). Since there must be communication between 
modules to deliver functionality (whatever the commitment to encapsulation of knowledge 
within modules), why shouldn’t such communication lead to a spread of deficits throughout 
communicating modules? Or, conversely, allow a deficit to be compensated for amongst a 
set of modules? The computational principles that would or would not permit deficit spread 
or deficit compensation have been a central concern of neuroconstructivists (see e.g., 
Baughman & Thomas, 2008; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002) because to identify these 
principles is to identify the constraints that shape development. 
Contra MCL, then, we argue that modularity is not the key concern; the key concern 
is specifying the nature of the developmental process. 
4. A modular neuroconstructivist approach? 
While MCL took their findings to falsify one neuroconstructivist hypothesis of language 
development in WS (the Imbalance Hypothesis), they took them to favour another (the 
Conservative Hypothesis). MCL argued, however, that the Conservative Hypothesis is in 
fact a species of modular account. Under the Conservative Hypothesis, language 
development in WS is held to be line with non-verbal mental age, once non-verbal 
intelligence tests that depend on visuo-spatial skills have been stripped out – since these are 
a known weakness in the disorder (Brock, 2007; Thomas, 2008; Thomas & Karmiloff-
Smith, 2003; see also Mervis, 2006, for the view that language in WS is normal but 
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delayed.) If language development is simply delayed then, argued MCL, it must have the 
same modular structure.1 
It is certainly true that the Conservative Hypothesis implies that many of the wider 
constraints shaping language development in WS are not perturbed by the disorder: for 
example, basic input-output systems and channels of information flow such as the motor 
systems driving articulation, the perceptual systems interpreting input, the multi-modal 
systems linking to conceptual knowledge, and pragmatic systems linking with social and 
emotional systems. Moreover, the mechanisms that process sequential structure in 
production and comprehension would have to bear some relation to those found in the 
range of normal development. However in WS, all these systems appear to deliver 
performance that is lower than expected given chronological age. And the empirical data 
remain mixed on whether the state of the component systems in WS is identical to that 
found in younger typically developing children. For example, data do exist that indicate 
anomalies in semantics, pragmatics, and syntax (e.g., respectively, Thomas et al., 2006; 
Bishop & Laws, 2004; Perovic & Wexler, in press). The fact that phonology appears to be 
one of the strongest domains in WS may underlie the prominence of receptive vocabulary 
skills, as well as the relative strength in language overall compared to disorders 
characterised by phonological deficits (such as Down syndrome and Specific Language 
Impairment). To argue that phonology explains superior language development compared 
to some other disorders is not the same as arguing that all WS language is achieved by rote 
                                                 
1
 Strictly speaking, MCL’s data are only partially consistent with the Conservative Hypothesis. They are 
consistent because, within the authors’ framework, they observed no markers of atypicality. They are 
inconsistent because the results indicated WS task performance was in fact worse than would be expected 
given their non-verbal mental age. 
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memorisation of phonological forms. McDonald (1997), for instance, argued that the 
quality of phonological representations is a predictor of the relative success or failure of 
language acquisition across a range of typical and atypical populations, including early and 
late first and second language learners. 
5. Delay – of no theoretical interest? 
We have seen that MCL felt able to characterise language as developing normally in WS 
despite a developmental delay of more than 10 years on their task. The implication was that 
delay does not bear on the normality of development. But what is the explanation for the 
delay? Presumably, one could argue that in the case of syntax development, the relevant 
mechanisms are afflicted by whatever it is that causes learning disability in the rest of the 
system; or that mechanisms on which syntax acquisition relies such as vocabulary and 
working memory are so afflicted. 
 This line of argument glosses over the fact that we have little idea of what delay 
actually constitutes, other than a re-description of the behavioural observation that 
performance resembles that of younger typically developing controls. Descriptively, delay 
is a blunt term that conflates several different patterns of divergence from the range of 
typical developmental trajectories (Thomas et al., 2009). Mechanistically, the situation is 
worse. They are no concrete proposals of how delay should work. Were we to formulate a 
mechanistic account, testable predictions should surely follow. For example, if one thought 
that the mechanisms mediating development just worked more slowly, one might predict 
some of the following: (1) for any domain with a ceiling performance level, individuals 
with delay should eventually catch up; (2) in those sensory domains with sensitive periods, 
the periods should be extended (for example, in specialisation to the phonemic contrasts of 
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one’s own language); (3) in domains where there is specialisation of function, this 
specialisation should also emerge later (e.g., in face recognition, for faces in an upright 
orientation); and (4) there should be identical quality of processing when individuals are 
matched for performance level, where quality is assessed by the effect of implicit variables 
like frequency, imageability, similarity, and so forth. (5) Where delay is widespread, the 
reduction in rate should be the same across all cognitive domains, since the same 
mechanism can’t obviously explain lots of different delays (other than posthoc). (6) Where 
delay is argued to be focal, under no developmental theory should any other cognitive 
system rely on the affected component for its own successful development. Hypotheses 
such as these are rarely articulated, let alone tested (and in some cases, they are obviously 
false – individuals with delay rarely reach full adult levels of performance). And this is 
indicative of the very provisional status of ‘delay’ as an explanatory concept. 
Indeed, by considering the ‘causes of delay’, we many not even be asking the right 
question. The deeper issue here is what causes developmental profiles in a given cognitive 
domain to be similar and what causes them to be different. Some researchers are inclined to 
view similarities as solely arising from internal constraints or mechanisms (see Thomas, 
2005, for discussion). But there are at least two other potential sources: the structure of the 
cognitive domain (in terms of which aspects are hard and which aspects are easy, a factor 
that will hold across a range of architectures attempting to acquire the domain), and the 
information available in an individual’s subjective environment. For example, recent 
research on the impact of socio-economic status (SES) on syntax development revealed 
similarities across SES groups on measures tapping mastery of basic syntactic rules of 
simple sentences, but differences in the mastery of complex sentence structures that were 
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apparent from the earliest stages of production of multi-clause sentences (Vasilyeva, 
Waterfall & Huttenlocher, 2008). In this case, both similarities and differences emerge 
from an environmental variable. 
It is therefore far from clear that we should dismiss delay as irrelevant to whether 
language development is typical or not. When we allude to the phenomenon of delay, we 
merely highlight those aspects of developmental profiles that are qualitatively similar 
between groups when chronological age is ignored, without requiring deeper insights into 
the reason why. One method to pursue such insights is by explicit implementation of the 
developmental process in computational models (see, e.g., Thomas, Ronald & Forrester, 
submitted). Here it becomes apparent that minimally, delay may result from attempting to 
solve roughly the same problem, with poorer computational resources or from using the 
same computational resources to solve a problem when provided with poorer information. 
So far we have considered delay in respect of individual domains. How does one 
characterise a disorder if all aspects of language (or cognition) are delayed, but the size of 
the delay differs across these components? A focus on any one domain indicates 
performance resembles that of younger typically developing controls. If delay is of no 
theoretical interest, one would conclude that all the components of the system are 
developing normally, just with different delays. Nevertheless, the component parts of the 
cognitive system must interact with each other to deliver function and in many cases, to 
develop future functions. How could the delays be different? To put it more starkly, isn’t 
differential delay across the components of the cognitive system itself atypical? 
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6. Conclusion: The nature of syntax in WS 
The strength of MCL’s study of language comprehension in WS is to challenge those 
researchers who claim WS language development is atypical to explain how the degree of 
successful behaviour that was observed (in this case, above chance performance in the 
Truth Value Judgement Task) could have been produced using different underlying 
processes. Such an account might presumably appeal to lexical or semantic/pragmatic 
compensatory mechanisms, or comprise processes that contain some but not all of the 
grammatical properties outlined in the generative theory, or employ computational 
mechanisms that approximate formal syntactic systems under some processing conditions 
but not others (Christiansen & Chater, 2001; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). The 
conclusion that the results are evidence of normal language development in the disorder are 
undermined by the low accuracy levels exhibited by the individuals with WS (worse indeed 
than their level of non-verbal cognition) and the presence of at least one marker of 
atypicality, namely the relationship between component language skills. We have argued 
that the authors’ conclusion is partly dependent on a set of assumptions regarding how the 
experimental data should be interpreted. Nevertheless, even with similar assumptions and 
methods, other researchers have recently come to the opposite conclusion, that aspects of 
syntax develop atypically in WS. Perovic and Wexler (in press) found deficits in the 
comprehension of the passive and interpreted their evidence as pointing to a dissociation 
between aspects of linguistic knowledge in the disorder. A juxtaposition of the respective 
findings of Musolino, Chunyo and Landau and Perovic and Wexler indicate that there is 
still work to be done before a consensus emerges on the nature of linguistic knowledge in 
Williams syndrome and its developmental origins. 
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